NRGの抵抗とempty voting？

NRG Blasts Exelon Bid as Deadline Approaches (New York Times 2/18/09)

株式対価の買収提案に対して、対象会社の取締役会が株主に対して公開買付けに応募しないよう働きかけるということ自体は珍しい話ではないものの、興味深い点をいくつか抜粋

Even so, many NRG shareholders appear to be taking Exelon up on its offer. Exelon said in January that about 46 percent of NRG shareholders had already tendered their shares.

At least one major NRG shareholder suspects that cross-ownership ― that is, the ownership of both NRG and Exelon shares by a single investor ― is a big reason the tender offer has gained traction.

というわけで、その"one major NRG shareholder"であるSOLUS ALTERNATIVE ASSET MANAGEMENT LPがSECにファイリングしたSchedule 13Dを見てみると、同ファンドがNRG宛に送った手紙が添付資料としてついていて、そこにこんな一節が

We are particularly concerned about Exelon's recent press release claiming that the tender of 45.6% of NRG's stock in response to the exchange offer "speaks powerfully to the merits of [its] proposed transaction . . . ." We understand that a significant number of NRG stockholders also have substantial holdings of Exelon - a matter not mentioned in Exelon's release. To the extent that NRG holders who have tendered into the current offer have more invested in Exelon, their decision to tender may well represent a judgment that the offer is favorable to EXELON rather than NRG.

The Board should evaluate the exchange offer on its merits and in light of the expected long-term value of NRG's business, rather than on the basis of self-interested arguments concerning the significance of stockholder reaction to the current offer. As I am sure you know, under Delaware law, the NRG Board must act in the interests of ALL NRG stockholders but may take into account the fact that some stockholders have goals that conflict with the interests of other stockholders. SEE UNOCAL v. MESA, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.1985) (a board of directors in responding to a takeover bid may consider another person's stock ownership; board's duty is to protect "the corporation and its owners from perceived harm whether a threat originates from third parties or other shareholders.")

これは、最近少しずつ話題になり始めている"empty voting"にも通じる話です。買付価格というのは、買収側株主と対象会社株主との間でのパイの取り分の問題ですから、例えば、NRG株式を100ドル分、Exelon株式を200ドル持っている投資家にとっては、買付価格が安い＝Exelonに有利な方が得をするということになります。そうだとすると、対象会社の株主の多くが買付価格に賛成しているという事実は、必ずしも対象会社にとって望ましい価格であることを意味しているとは限らないということになります*1

その他にもNRGの取締役会が株主宛に出したレター(NRG Energy, Inc. Issues Open Letter to NRG Stockholders (NRG Press Release 2/18/09))なんかも、トーンなど参考にすべき点も多いので、メモ代わりということで。

*1:empty votingについては、MylanとKingのディールなどでの実例も含めて、同僚と共著で書いた論文がファンド法制―ファンドをめぐる現状と規制上の諸課題に収録されていますので、宜しければご参照下さい。